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which focuses on the rights of the defendant rather than on the
trial judge's discretion. The Supreme Court of California has taken
one of the oldest common law writs and dressed it in new attire. It
remains to be seen whether the attire will become fashionable.
EARL M. TUCKER

RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
The grand jury, being an extension of the court, has as its function
the inquiry into all offenses within its jurisdiction.' Traditionally the
investigation is conducted in secret and consists of an examination of
witnesses by a prosecuting attorney.2 The witness does not have a right
to have counsel present with him in the grand jury room,3 but in some
jurisdictions the procedure is to allow consultation with counsel out4
side the confines of the room.

The recent decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in People
v. Ianniello5 raises questions concerning the existence and scope of a
grand jury witness' right to consult with counsel outside the grand
jury room. The defendant was summoned before the grand jury as
a witness in connection with an investigation of a bribery conspiracy
involving police and officials of the New York State Liquor Authority. At the outset he refused to be sworn on the grounds that he was
a defendant in a pending misdemeanor prosecution. The Assistant
District Attorney informed the defendant that he was being called
'See Note, The Grand Jury-Its Investigatory Powers and Limitation, 37 MINN.
L. Rrv. 586 (953).
-See Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189 (1967).
3United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897
(1955); In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Levine, 127 F. Supp.
651 (D. Mass. 1955); United States v. Blanton, 77 . Supp. 812 (E.D. Mo. 1948);
see Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion); cf.
Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957);
Anonymous v. Arkwright, 5 App. Div. 2d 790, 17o N.Y.S.2d 535 (1958).
'United States v. Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1025 (1968); United States v. Kane, 243 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.28.075 (Supp. 1967) allowing counsel inside the grand jury
room:
During any time that a witness appears before a grand jury, he shall
be entitled to the presence of an attorney to advise him: Provided, That
said attorney shall only advise such witness concerning his right to answer
or not answer any questions asked of such witness and shall not engage in
the proceedings in any other manner.
r 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 90 (1968).
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solely in the role of a witness in the investigation of the bribery conspiracy. Later he was told that the grand jury had voted to confer
immunity upon him. 6 With these assurances the defendant consented
to be sworn. When questioned about certain prior conversations with
an individual under investigation, the defendant answered that he
did not recall such conversations. Pressed by the Assistant District
Attorney to affirm or deny that the conversation had taken place, the
defendant asked to be allowed to leave the grand jury room to see his
attorney concerning the propriety of the question. This request was
denied and, after the defendant persisted, the prosecutor suggested
they go into open court and make an application. This course was not
pursued, possibly because the defendant did not understand the prosecutor's suggestion to go into open court. 7 Instead, at the prosecutor's
6
The immunity which the Assistant District Attorney purported to offer the
witness was based upon N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2447 (McKinney 1967). This section is
now N.Y. CODE CRI1. PROC. § 619-c (McKinney Supp. 1968). According to the
opinion of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York the record
did not show that the grand jury had voted to grant the defendant immunity or
that the conditions precedent to such a grant had been fulfilled. Actually the
defendant had not been granted immunity, regardless of the Assistant District
Attorney's assurances. People v. Ianniello, 27 App. Div. 2d 504, 28o N.Y.S.2d
852, 853 (1967). For the purposes of this comment, however, the absence of immunity
is immaterial because a grand jury witness can be prosecuted for contempt committed in answering a question (or in failing to answer it) without valid grounds
whether or not immunity has been conferred. People v. De Feo, 284 App. Div.
622, 131 N.Y.S.2d 8o6 (1954), reVd on other grounds, 3o8 N.Y. 595, 127 N.E.2d
592 (1955)There is evidence from the transcript of the colloquy that the witness did
not understand the Assistant District Attorney's suggestion to go into open court.
The court of appeals did not seem concerned with whether or not he did understand and did not address itself to the question. The colloquy went as follows:
Q. Does that enable you to be able to deny ever having such a conversation with Benny Cohen? A. Could I excuse myself to see my attorney
for a minute?
By Mr. Scotti:
Q. Your attorney doesn't know the answer. You are the one who
knows. A. I want to ask him if it's a proper question.
Q. I'm telling you, as legal advisor to this grand jury, it's a proper
question. A. May I ask the foreman of the grand jury if I may excuse myself
for a minute, please?
Q. Mr. laniello, we are not going to consent to the practice of your
excusing yourself to confer ostensibly with your attorney in order to find
out what kind of an answer you should make. You are the one that is
legally obligated to give testimony and not your attorney.
Now, are you refusing to answer the question? A. I'm not refusing.
Q. After you answer the question you can confer-A. I'd like to confer
with my attorney because I think it's an improper question.
Q. Why? A. I don't know.
Q. Why? Why is it improper? You said you think it's improper. A. I
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wouldn't need an attorney outside if I knew why. I think it's an improper
question.
Q. Why do you think it's improper, why? A. I don't know why.
Q. Because it's a very very serious matter. It involves your knowledge of
payoffs, your knowledge of the fact that you were receiving information,
confidential information from certain members of the Police Department,
is that the reason why it bothers you? A. Mr. ScottiQ. You are on the spot, is that the reason? Is that the reason why you
hesitate because an answer to that question, an affirmative answer, would
mean to this grand jury that you are admitting that you do have information from the police and that you do business with the police? Is that
what you are worried about? Is that what you are- A. Mr. Scotti, you are
drawing conclusions. You made your statements, you might as well indict
me. You have all the evidence.
Q. Why don't you want to answer the question? A. There is no use to
go any further unless I consult my attorney.
The Witness: Mr. Foreman, do I have your permission to leave this
room and consult my attorney?
Mr. Scotti: Shall we go to court for a direction.
The Witness: Go to court. I don't understand the question.
Mr. Scotti: We will go in open court, then, and make an application.
You don't understand the question.
Mr. Reporter, read the question.
The Witness: I didn'tMr. Scotti: Now, he said he doesn't understand the question.
The Witness: I didn't say-I said, "Will you please repeat the
question. Don't jump conclusions.
Mr. Scotti: Read the question. Mr. Reporter, will you be good
enough to read what the witness said a little while ago.
(Whereupon, the reporter read as follows:
"Question: Why don't you want to answer the question?
Answer: There is no use to go any further unless I consult my
attorney.
The Witness: Mr. Foreman, do I have your permission to leave
this room and consult my attorney?
Mr. Scotti: Shall we go to court for a direction?
The Witness: Go to court. I don't understand the question.
Mr. Scotti: We will go in open court, then, and make an
application.')
Q. Now, has your memory been refreshed that you said you didn't
understand the question? A. Yes, sir.
Q. We accept your apology. A. Thank you.
Q. Now, are you willing to answer the question?
The Witness: Mr. Foreman, may I please leave the room to
consult with my attorney as to the significance of the question?
The Foreman: I can't give you permission to do so without
consent of Mr. Scotti.
Mr. Scotti: I advise the grand jury that this is a proper question
and that there is no legal question involved.
Now, Mr. Foreman, I ask that you direct this witness to answer
the question.
The Foreman: I so direct you to answer.
A. I don't recall the conversation.
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request, the grand jury foreman directed the witness to answer. He
thereupon repeated that he did not recall the conversations. The witness was then indicted for contempt on the basis of the evasive testimony.8
The Supreme Court of New York dismissed the indictment, stating
that the defendant, while testifying before the grand jury, was denied the right to counsel when he was refused permission to leave the
grand jury room and discuss the propriety of a question with his
counsel. The appellate division of the supreme court affirmed on
other grounds without reaching the issue of right of counsel. 9 The
New York court of appeals reversed the decision and the indictment
was reinstated. The court reasoned that although a witness at a grand
jury proceeding has a right to consult his lawyer concerning questions of "legal rights," he has no right to consult counsel as to "matters of strategy." The court said the phrase "legal rights" embraces
such things as the right of asserting or waiving the privilege against
self-incrimination, the right to refuse to answer questions having no
bearing on the subject of the investigation, and the right to refuse to
answer a question involving a testimonial privilege enjoyed by the
witness and to which he may be subject, for example, between attorney
and client, doctor and patient, or husband and wife. 10 However, there
was no indication by the court as to what the phrase "matters of
strategy" encompasses. The court went on to say that if the witness'
request for counsel is denied and he feels he has a colorable claim
he must continue in his refusal to answer, thus forcing the prosecutor
to take the matter into open court for a ruling. There, the presiding
judge can rule on questions of pertinency after argument of counsel
and decide whether the witness must answer the question.
The issue of right to counsel before a grand jury was first considered in 1931 in In re Black" where the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit denied there was any right to counsel inside the grand
jury room. The court emphasized that a witness should not be "furnished with facilities for evading issues or concealing true facts."' 2 The
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8-9. (Emphasis added). As of the time of this
writing the Supreme Court had not yet passed on this petition.
"The court reasoned that the defendant's answer was so evasive as to amount
to no testimony at all. 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d at 442, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 466; accord,
People v. De Feo, 284 App. Div. 622, 131 N.Y.S.2d 8o6 (1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 3o8 N.Y 595, 127 N.E.2d 592 (1955).
927 App. Div. 2d 504, 280 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1967). The appellate division found that
the defendant was, in fact, never really granted immunity. See note 6 supra.
1021 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d at 44S, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69.
147 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931).

"Id. at 543.
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court noted that the grand jury, as an investigatory body seeking to
feret out crime and criminals, requires the most ample power of investigation. It pointed out that for any needed protection a witness
must rely upon his privilege against self-incrimination to be invoked
when the occasion arises. 13 Black presented a blueprint for courts in
dealing with the question of right to counsel before a grand jury, and
14
the case was followed in many instances.
The United States Supreme Court decided the question of a right
to counsel under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
in In re Groban.'5 There, several witnesses refused to answer questions at a secret investigation conducted by a fire marshall' 6 on the
grounds that they were denied the immediate presence of counsel.
The Court, noting that a grand jury witness cannot be represented
by counsel, denied any violation of the due process clause and held
that there was no right to the presence of counsel. Although Black
was not directly cited, the Court adopted almost the same language in
stressing that a witness' protection is his privilege against self-incrimination.' r
In 1958 a New York state court, in a case' s involving a fact situation similar to Groban, upheld a contempt conviction where the
witness had based his refusal to testify on the ground that his counsel
was excluded from the grand jury room. The court stated that it
was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the attorney from the room.19
As a result of the recent landmark decisions of the United States
Supreme Court 0 concerning the sixth amendment right to counsel,
23Id. at 544.
"'In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957); United States v. Kane, 243 F. Supp.
746, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812, 816-17 (E.D. Mo.
1948); Gordon v. Gerstein, 189 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1966); Dinnen v. State, 168
So. 2d 703, 704-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
'0352 U.S. 330 (1957).
uThe investigation was authorized by Ohio statute, OHio Ry. COBF ANN.
§ 3737.08 (Baldwin 1964).
' 7"When such charges are made in a criminal proceeding, he then may defend
the presence of his counsel for his defense. Until then his protection is the privilege
against self-incrimination." 352 U.S. at 333.
18Anonymous v. Arkwright, 5 App. Div. 2d 790, 17o N.Y.S.2d 535 (1958).
"Id. at 538. Groban and Arkwright involved secret interrogations provided by
statute and which incorporated much of the same procedure as a grand jury.
The same underlying principles applied to both these cases and the Black case.
All three were concerned with the right to counsel within the room where the
proceedings were being conducted.
"'See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon the Supreme
Court held that the sixth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that
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the argument has been renewed to extend this right to grand jury
proceedings. 21 Thus far, the cases have all held that there is no constitutional right to counsel in the grand jury room. 22 However, until
now the courts have not been called upon to adjudicate the question
of a witness' right to consult with counsel outside of the grand jury
room. This is an important link which is missing in the development
of case law concerning the rights of a grand jury witness to counsel.
Although the point has not been judicially passed upon, the
procedure for the district courts in the Southern District of New York
has been to allow the witness to consult with counsel outside the
grand jury room, 23 and United States v. Leighton24 seems implicitly
to recognize this procedure has the status of a right. Here the defendant was indicted for bribery after testifying before the grand
jury. He moved to vacate the indictment on the ground that the
exclusion of counsel from the grand jury proceedings had violated
his sixth amendment right to counsel. The court held the right was
not violated but noted that the grand jury had specifically advised the
defendant that he had a right to consult with counsel outside the
grand jury room at any time he chose. 25 Although the right to counsel
outside the grand jury room was not the issue before the court, the
fact that the court placed great emphasis on defendant's freedom of
access to his attorney indicates that, in the absence of such access, the
court might well have found a violaion of the sixth amendment.
Further indication of the significance of defendant's access to counsel
outside the grand jury room is the fact that the court, in determining
in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to assistance of
counsel, was made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment. Escobedo
reversed a murder conviction where the defendant had been denied counsel in
pre-trial interrogation and was not advised of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. Miranda requires giving a suspect who is in custody the now
famous four warnings: i) the accused has the right to remain silent; 2) he has
the right to the presence of his attorney; 3) if he has no attorney, one will
be obtained for him if he so desires; 4) anything said can be used against him.
"See Directory Services, Inc. v. United States, 353 F.2d 299, 3o1 (8th Cir.
1965); Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F. Supp. 673, 682 (E.D. La. 1967); United States
v. Kane, 243 F. Supp. 746, 753-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
rDirectory Services, Inc. v. United States, 353 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1965);
Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. La. 1967); United States v. Leighton,
265 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Kane, 243 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
"United States v. Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v.
Kane, 243 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp.
640 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
2"265 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2id. at 36-37.
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the issue of right to counsel inside the grand jury room, did not rely
on Black or Groban for authority. In fact, it ignored them completely
and based its decision upon an independent analysis of the facts of
the case and of defendant's rights under the sixth amendment.
In denying the right to counsel within the grand jury room, Black
reasoned that a witness should not be "furnished with facilities for
evading issues or concealing true facts. '20 Underlying this reasoning
was the court's emphasis that a witness' only protection was his right
against self-incrimination. 27 Subsequent courts which followed the
Black rule 2s have also relied upon the protection of the fifth amendment to the exclusion of the sixth amendment. Such a philosophy is
antagonistic towards the right to counsel. In light of the recent
Supreme Court decisions which appear to say that there is a direct
correlation between the sixth amendment right to counsel and the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 29 it is hard
to reconcile a contemporary adoption of this attitude.
Yet Ianniello, the principal case, seems to adopt precisely this
position. It recognizes the difficulty of maintaining that a witness is
not entitled to the advice of his lawyer, yet it refuses to declare an
absolute right to counsel. The court notes that a witness should be
entitled to consult with counsel where his "legal rights" are concerned
but not where "matters of strategy" are involved. The problem is that
at times there may be a very fine distinction between legal rights and
strategy, as for example, when the question arises as to the proper
time to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Invoking the
privilege is a legal right but strategy may be involved in its execution
or waiver.
The grand jury witness faced with a question requiring an answer
which may be damaging has several choices of action. First (if not
granted immunity), he may answer the question, braving the possibility that his testimony will be used as evidence against him at a
later trial. 30 Second, he may exercise his right to invoke his privilege
against self-incrimination.3 1 This exercise, however, is not without its
'47 F.2d at 543.
'Id.

at

544.

nSee generally cases cited note 14 supra.
See note ao supra.

IOUnder New York law it does not appear that mere testimony will constitute
a waiver of immunity or privilege against self-incrimination. See N'Y. CODE CRtIM.
PROC. § 619-e (McKinney Supp. 1968).
"This assumes the witness is aware of his right, for a witness testifying before
a grand jury need not be advised of his constiutional right against self-incrimina-
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pitfalls. The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because
he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself. His judgment alone does not establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for
the court to decide whether his silence is justified.3 2 A reluctant witness whom the court determines has made an unwarranted refusal to
answer may quite possibly be faced with a contempt indictment. Thus,
in pursuing this course the witness must ascertain his right against
self-incrimination at his peril and without the benefit of counsel. 32
Third, the witness may request a consultation with counsel. This
would appear to be the best course of action for a witness who is not
certain of his rights. However, under lanniello this becomes a question for the prosecutor and the grand jury foreman to decide. If it
is determined that the request falls within the boundary of "legal
rights," the witness may enjoy the benefit of counsel. But a seasoned
prosecutor might refuse the request in the hopes of obtaining important testimony. Under Ianniello, if the witness still feels he has a
valid claim to the advice of the counsel, he should continue to refuse
to answer, thereby forcing the prosecutor to seek a ruling in open
court. However, this procedure could cause hardships. If a witness
did not know he had a right to continue to refuse to answer and
force the matter into open court, he might think, as the defendant in
lanniello apparently did, that the only alternative to making the
incriminating statement is to give an evasive answer.
The procedure noted in the Leighton case, which allows the witness to consult with his attorney outside the grand jury room at his
own discretion, avoids the problems which Ianniello raises. By drawing a distinction between questions of "legal rights" and "matters of
strategy," lanniello puts a grand jury witness who is ignorant of grand
jury procedures into a position where his own determination of
strategy may subject him to a charge of criminal contempt. Although professing to protect a witness' "legal rights," the court by
limiting his sixth amendment right to counsel has also hampered
an effective implementation of the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.
tion. United States v. DiMichele, 375 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1967); See United States

v. Orta, 253 F.2d

312 (sth Cir. 1958); United States v. Ponti, 257 F. Supp. 925
(E.D. Pa. 1966).
12
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Rogers v. United States,
340 U.S. 367, 874 (1951); Glotzbach v. Klavans, 196 F. Supp. 685, 688 (E.D. Va.
1961). But see United States v. Licavoli, 102 F. Supp. 607, 609 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
'"W]hen a witness is deprived of the advice of counsel he may be completely
unaware that his conduct has crossed the obscure boundary and become contemptuous." In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1957) (dissenting opinion).

